

**Applications of the New National Security Strategy  
Of the United States of America  
in the Middle East:  
*A Post-September 11<sup>th</sup> Analysis***

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**FOR MY FAMILY**

## ABBREVIATIONS

ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile  
APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum  
ASEAN – Association with South-East Asian Nations  
CDI – Center for Defense Information  
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency (US)  
C-4 – powerful and compact explosive material  
DU – Depleted Uranium ICBM – Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile  
ICC – International Criminal Court  
ICJ – International Court of Justice  
IMF – International Monetary Fund  
INC – Iraqi National Council  
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation  
NSA – National Security Agency  
NSC – National Security Council  
NSS02 – The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)  
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom, the US military campaign in Afghanistan, 2001  
ORH – Operation Restore Hope, the name of the US military campaign in Iraq, 2003  
RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade RRF – Rapid Reaction Force  
SDI – Strategic Defense Initiative, a satellite system for destroying incoming ICBM's  
SLBM – Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile  
UNSC – United Nations Security Council  
UNMOVIC – United Nations Monitoring, Verifications, and Inspection Commission  
UNSCOM – United Nations Special Commission  
USD – United States Dollars  
WB – World Bank  
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction  
WTO – World Trade Organisation

## GLOSSARY

Afrikaaner – white colonial settlers of southern Africa

al Qa'ida – an elusive network of Islamic militants blamed for September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, attacks on the US

Crusades – term used by early Christians for 'holy war' campaigns against the Muslims

Hamas – Palestinian militant Islamic organisation resisting Israeli occupation

Hizbullah – militant Islamic resistance organization in Lebanon, now a political party

Intifada – Arabic word meaning 'uprising' in reference to Palestinian resistance

Jihad – Arabic word meaning 'holy war', a reference to the Qur'an of the Islamic faith

Kalashnikov – Russian Army issue automatic assault-rifle (AK-47)

Kyoto Protocol – international agreement on the environment, presently being ratified

Martyr – a person who dies in the name of their god

Northern Alliance – coalition of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Afghans armed by US forces in 2001

PLO – Palestinian political party, recognised government of the Palestinian territories

Qur'an – holy text of the Islamic faith; also spelled 'Koran' in western literature

Shia – a branch of Islam, as opposed to Sunni Muslims

Taliban – fundamentalist Islamic organisation governing Afghanistan between 1980 and 2001

Zionist – from Zionism, a Jewish movement to reclaim Israel from the Palestinians

## - Chapter I -

### INTRODUCTION

*In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favours human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.*

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George W. Bush, The White House, 17 September 2002

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The relatively predictable bi-polarity of the international security environment that existed throughout the Cold War ended abruptly in an epic anti-climax and was followed by eruptions of intra-state conflicts. Widespread ethnic ‘cleansing’ of territories, and wars of succession and secession became the hallmark of reintroduction into a multipolar realm of international relations. US national security strategies evolved with the changing environment. The Clinton Administration’s national security agenda that was based on an evolution from the containment strategies espoused during the Cold War to a strategy of enlargement of the ‘free-market democracies’; pretty much a re-iteration of Bush Seniors’ Administrations national security strategies. While containment would remain central to strategic policy, ‘enlargement’ would serve to expand the reach of US interests. This was to be achieved primarily through incentives in the form of aid packages, rewarding poorer states for ‘opening’ their domestic markets to international investment and adhering to ‘democratic’ norms.

This strategy appeared to achieve some level of normality in international relations, at least on the surface, the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, debuted the emergence of the new non-state threat of terrorism as the new primary concern for the national security of the United States. The Bush Administration's reaction to the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon came in the form of a massive overhaul of the entire US security apparatus and a redefinition of US strategic objectives outlined in the new **National Security Strategy of the United States of America** published by the White House Sept. 17<sup>th</sup>, 2002 (NSS02). This document has been described by a leading specialist in US military history as, "the most important reformulation of the US grand strategy in over half a century" (Gaddis 2003:1). What does Gaddis mean by this? What is the NSS02, and how is it a 'reformulation' of the US grand strategy? And considering the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), what implications does this have for the future of US policy towards the Middle East?

The last major shift in the US 'grand strategy' came in the aftermath of WWII with the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) and its subsidiary organizations like the Department of Defense. The NSC designed a national security strategy that would guide US foreign policy for decades, and its tenants are very instructive in terms of understanding the present environment of international relations. National architects such as George Kennan and Paul Nitze formulated NSC Memorandum 68 in 1948, a particular quote from which is used frequently by academics and activists in order to debunk the notion that US military action promotes freedom and democracy.

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We have 50 percent of the world's wealth, but only 6.3 percent of its population. In this situation we cannot fail to be the

object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will allow us to maintain this position of disparity. We should cease to talk about the raising of the living standards, human rights, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.<sup>1</sup>

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The ramifications of this top-secret document, made public through the Freedom of Information Act, are far reaching. For one, it appears to contradict the widely held belief that the Cold War was about defending the west against communism and replaces it with the reality of an emerging super power determined to maintain its disproportionate wealth. It is interesting to note that the aspirations of human rights and spreading democracy are dubbed ‘idealistic slogans’ that should be consigned to the rubbish bin. The new NSS02 is perhaps the greatest ‘reformulation’ since NSC Memorandum 68 and as such it might be viewed as a radical new phase in the evolution of the US ‘grand strategy’.

The events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, and the various reactions that followed within the international community have raised many questions about the emerging dynamics of international peace and security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Within the framework of Peace and Development studies, as a branch of international relations in politics, the instance of US national security strategy is of particular relevance. The powerful and indeed highly visible emergence of US national security mechanisms post-September 11<sup>th</sup>, and the impact they are having on international security, and the way we define international security, is a process worth recording. From a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence, the US is claiming that it holds not only a responsibility to oversee an international ‘police force’ to ensure the safety of American citizens, its allies and friends, but also to

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<sup>1</sup> This quote from NSC Memorandum 68 was taken from Robinson 1995:22

export its own model of free-market democracy to ‘every corner of the world’. “The aim of this new strategy is to help make the world not only safer but better” (NSS02 2002:3).

The NSS02 is clear on how this should be achieved; “champion aspirations for human dignity,” and, “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy,” in order to, “ignite a new era of global economic growth through free-markets and free-trade.” (NSS02 2002:1). While the terms ‘development’, ‘democracy’, and ‘global economic growth’ are generally perceived as positive, when used in this context the process appears intrusive and virtually ignore the sovereign right of nations to choose their own governments. When the pretext of US national security is used to legitimise regime change in states that oppose US foreign policy the implications open up a Pandora’s box for conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

This research aims to provide a theoretical model for conceptualising a primary element of the ‘Bush Doctrine,’ as enshrined in newly introduced NSS02. The proposed case study is the Middle East, as recent events in the region provide ample data for analysing the practical application of the new security policy. Particular focus will be given to, but not limited to, Afghanistan and Iraq. The primary objectives include: Identifying and explaining the mechanisms utilised by the United States in the process of pursuing these security objectives, observing how these mechanisms either serve or hinder US objectives of spreading democracy and championing the aspirations of human dignity, and creating knowledge about the

social, economic and political consequences of US national security policies for Middle East and beyond.

While the current literature on US national security policies is comprehensively applicable to a study of the Middle East, there is a gap in the literature with respect to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), as introduced by the current Bush Administration. This paper will advance both theoretical and practical knowledge concerning the implementation of this new strategy and the particular relevance it has for the Middle East. It is perceived that the new National Security Strategy is an efficient mechanism for affecting the prevailing social, economic and political climate in the region. Programming aimed at implementing this new strategy has resulted in increased US military presence in the region, subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and heightened civil unrest throughout the region and the world. Increased academic attention to such programming will contribute towards building a knowledge base which can be consulted by policy makers, diplomats, NGO workers, educators, and so on.

The present period is one of rapid transformation of the entire US national security apparatus. The implementation of the new strategies as envisioned in NSS02 constitute the cornerstone of the Bush Doctrine. This research will review the objectives sought by the Bush Administration, and the practical reality when these strategies are applied, particularly in the Middle East. The situation unfolding in Iraq provides fertile ground for study, as does Afghanistan (although located in Central Asia). Summarizing the military, diplomatic, and economic manoeuvring employed

under the auspices of NSS02 in the region, the research provides insight into why US objectives might be in opposition to the will of the Arab peoples. This manoeuvring will be analysed by observing both the neo-liberal realist theory driving the NSS02 and an alternative theoretical approach as provided by TRANSCEND. As this new approach to assessing, mediating, and resolving conflict is based on non-violent responses, it clearly stands in contrast to the methods espoused in the Bush Doctrine. Yet, the goals of liberty, democracy, and human dignity remain very similar. While these ends the same, the means by which they are attained are quite different.

In politics, as in most things, perception plays a vital role in how we understand and respond to reality. The way in which people interpret events has a direct impact on how they use language to represent their perception, thus, a Chechen rebel is a ‘terrorist’ to the Russian government and a ‘freedom fighter’ to his countrymen. What the west commonly refers to as ‘suicide-bombing’ is considered a religious act of ‘martyrdom’ in the Islamic world. While the Israelis call the Palestinian terrorists, the Palestinians call the Israelis terrorists. Western government’s and media have generally chosen to follow the natural path of self-interest with regard to such labelling, yet as academics it is imperative that we be clear about the definitions of the terminology we use in our analysis, and to use such terms consistently and inclusively. For the purposes of clarity, the definition of the term ‘terrorism’ in this dissertation is one taken from the US Congressional Code, that is,

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“[An] act of terrorism, means any activity that (A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws if the United States or any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; or (ii) to influence the

policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.” (United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, Second Session, 1984, Oct. 19<sup>th</sup> volume 2; par 3077, 98 STAT. 2707 West Publishing Co., 1984)

Even with definitions one must remain sceptical about their origins; which terms are being used, by whom, and for what reason. US government officials have consistently made a clear distinction between terrorism and Islam; repeatedly pointing out that one does not beget the other. Yet, of 28 groups listed as terrorist organisations by the State Department, over half are militant Islamic groups<sup>2</sup>, and the emphasis within the new national security strategy on ‘spreading democracy’ throughout the Muslim Middle East confirms US focus on Islamic militancy. This raises the question of how it is decided which act is terrorism and which is an act of resistance against tyranny or foreign occupation.

Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the term terrorism has taken on a more propagandistic value in western media and official statements; ‘terrorism’ now appears to mean only a terrorist act carried out by enemies against American or Allied targets. In this sense of the word terrorism is condemned. Yet, even the Nazi’s condemned terrorism, though the partisan forces they labelled as such were later known as the heroes of WWII (Broz Tito [South-Eastern Europe], T.E. Lawrence [Middle East], Salvador Guillianio [Italy], to name a few). Nelson Mandela served decades of his life in prison for committing an act of terrorism - detonating a car bomb in Johannesburg that killed nine people – and now he is an internationally recognized symbol of peace. A man seen by the South Afrikaners as a terrorist was

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<sup>2</sup> US Department of State website accessed in February, 2003, at

perceived by much of the world as a freedom fighter in a legitimate resistance against tyranny. Another prime example is Eamonn de Valera, one of the leaders of the IRA uprising in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century that forced the British to retreat into the north of the island, was considered a terrorist by the British government and yet become the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) then the President of Ireland. There are several such examples that highlight the bias of perception, and why constant vigilance with regards to the use of the term 'terrorism' is necessary if we are to clearly understand the reality unfolding in the Middle East and elsewhere.

With the global system of states being divided by the United States into those who are willing to fight terrorism and those who are not, 'you're either with us or against us', followed by the caveat that, 'we make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbour or provide aid to them', there is an increasing responsibility for us ensure that our labelling reflects reality, and not just self-interest.

## - Chapter II -

### NSS02: AN OVERVIEW

The new NSS02 goes beyond the broad ranging national security objectives of the past by not only incorporating the security of the international community of states, but also openly taking responsibility for reforming states that do not comply with US interests. In this document, the US has proclaimed its empire by announcing the intention to dominate the globe and impose the infrastructure of ‘free-markets’ and ‘democracy’ on all states, through incentives where possible, or coercion, including military force, where ‘necessary’. While the new strategy echoes past objectives, there are many clear departures from pre-September 11<sup>th</sup> national security doctrine, all of which are linked, however dubiously, to the ‘war on terror’. Firstly, the re-introduction of the Wilsonian policy of ‘making the world safe for democracy’ through the promotion of an ‘American internationalism’. Second, the official introduction of a policy of waging pre-emptive war on perceived threats. Third, the recognition that non-state actors (possibly armed with WMD) are now as much a threat as enemy or ‘rogue’ states (now described as ‘failing states’). Fourth is an emphasis on co-operation with great powers. And fifth, the recognition that there are root causes to terrorism that must be addressed.

While Clinton’s NSS was to ‘enhance security’, ‘bolster economic prosperity’, and ‘promote democracy’ with the assumption of international peace, the Bush administration’s NSS02 powerfully projects these objectives, making them pro-active. “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace

by encouraging free and open societies on every continent” (NSS02 2002:3). The premise here being that ‘peace’ must be made before it can be kept. This proactive characteristic persists throughout NSS02. This is not surprising given the documents source.

The NSS02 is derived from a compilation of post-September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, speeches by President George W. Bush that outline the US international strategy in nine chapters. The first chapter summarises the entire document in brief, providing a glimpse into the nature of the objectives and how they will be achieved. “The US national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better” (NSS02 2002:3). The implication here is that the US will pursue a foreign/ security policy encouraging an ‘American internationalism’ which not only protects the international system of states, but also works to ‘better’ them in some way. This will be achieved through the key features of NSS02, encapsulated in the title of each chapter and outlined in the first chapter, are:

- (2) Champion the aspirations of human dignity
- (3) Strengthen alliances to prevent and defeat global terrorism
- (4) Work with others to defuse regional conflicts
- (5) Prevent our enemies from threatening peace with weapons of mass destruction
- (6) Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and trade
- (7) Expand the circle of development by promoting open societies and democracy
- (8) Develop agenda for co-operative action with main centers of global power
- (9) Transform America’s military and other national security institutions

A comprehensive study of the document, chapter by chapter, reveals that the US is now taking upon itself the burden of leadership of the world. “Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror... today humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedoms triumph over these foes. The United States welcomes the responsibility to lead in this great mission.” (NSS02 2002:3). While the

aspirations of ‘this great mission’ are bound to the ideal that, “people everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children – male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labour.”(NSS02 2002:8) there remains a great deal of scepticism, especially in the Middle East, with regards to the US’s commitment to these principles outside their own borders. Given the aspirations of NSC Memorandum 68 that has guided US policy toward the region for the last half century, this scepticism may not be unfounded.

Many sceptics, including leading dissident Noam Chomsky, use Nicaragua as a prime example of how the US reacts to these principles in weaker states in which it has national interests. For years the US supported, through various forms of aid, mostly military, the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, facilitating cheap exports of agricultural produce to the US. The brutality of the Somoza regime, described in detail in Chomsky’s seminal *Culture of Terrorism* and *Turning the Tide*, was overthrown in 1979 by a grass roots revolutionary movement that sought to retake the lands, a large percentage of which belonged to US multinational corporations involved in the agro-export industry (Chomsky 1988:98). Former President Reagan’s government launched an illegal counter-revolutionary war against this poor farming country, killing tens of thousands of civilians and devastating the economy so as to ensure that the newly emerged revolutionary government, the Sandinistas, were not able to implement reformation while having to defend from foreign invasion (Chomsky 1988:44).

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While Nicaragua struggled in guerrilla war, its case was brought before the World Court at the Hague which found in favour of Nicaragua, citing US violations of treaties and insisting on the immediate cessation of ‘the unlawful use of force’ against Nicaragua that amounted to ‘international terrorism’ (Chomsky 1988:211). Reagan’s response was to claim that the Soviets were infiltrating Central America and thus American national security was at stake, an argument that was never substantiated with evidence and dismissed by the World Court (*Ibid*). Citing national security reasons, the US dismissed the Courts judgement and proceeded to escalate its illegal war against Nicaragua (Chomsky 1988:212) So Nicaragua took its case to the UN Security Council. A resolution was being considered when it was vetoed by the US. The same resolution was passed by the powerless General Assembly with only the US and Israel opposing. By this time, the devastation wrought by US counter-insurgency forces saw the temporary retreat of the Sandanistas, but their recent resurrection has not gone unnoticed by the US, as “the Bush Administration warned that the leftist Sandinista party in Nicaragua, which hopes to return to power in elections next month, has maintained ties” (Gedda) with terrorists organizations, and as we know, “there is no middle ground between those who oppose terrorism and those who support it.”(NSS02 2002:6). So now it appears that Nicaragua has gone from being communists in league with Satan (Moscow in Reagan Administrations terminology), to being a ‘failed’ state harbouring terrorists’, again, without any evidence. One only hopes that the Sandanistas tread lightly enough not to incur another reign of terror.

If we thought of the historical record the US as a resume, one would hardly expect the US to be hired for the job as global arbiter of peace, democracy, freedom,

and human rights (Blum 1998:444-50).<sup>3</sup> Yet, this is the noble task the NSS02 sets squarely on the US's shoulders; a task which involves a distinctly American approach to international relations. So what exactly is this 'American internationalism' upon which NSS02 is based? Professor Richard Kugler, Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the US National Security University, addresses this pertinent question in *A Distinctly American Internationalism for a Globalized World*. We can ascertain key requirements for this emerging policy doctrine from Kugler's comments on NSS02; "Contrary to the expectations of critics, it is neither hegemonic and unilateralist, nor ultra-militarist and focused on pre-empting enemies". (Kugler 2002:1) Given this comment, it remains unclear whether Kugler actually reads what critics have to write; articles headlining recognised international relations journals such as *Foreign Affairs*, not to mention the millions of citizens across the western world who protested the pre-emptive war on Iraq, have criticised these exact qualities in US foreign policy under Bush. These descriptions (hegemonic, unilateralist, ultra-militarist, and focused on pre-emptive war) appear to define this new 'American internationalism'. That is, of course, assuming one is familiar with Orwellian 'newspeak'.<sup>4</sup>

The similarity between Kugler's four characteristics that 'do not' describe NSS02 and the Liebers' presentation of the four controversial themes within NSS02 draws attention. They are almost identical. Lieber and Lieber put forward four key

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<sup>3</sup> Here Blum gives an appendix listing every US military intervention abroad, from 1798 to 1945, followed by a list of known CIA assassination attempts against foreigner political leaders from 1949-1991.

<sup>4</sup> In George Orwell's novel, *1984*, the term 'newspeak' referred to a form of communication in which the words being used meant nearly the opposite of what was covertly intended. If one were to go through NSS02 and replace the words 'freedom' with 'capitalism', 'failed' or 'rogue' states with 'enemy', 'peace' with 'order', and so on, the application of the new strategy appears more like the reality unfolding at present.

themes within the Bush Administrations NSS02 that have ‘generated controversy’, analysing each to discover the ‘degree of continuity and change’ and the implications involved. While overtly patriotic in their critique, Liebers’ themes underline the core elements of the NSS02 and therefore provide a vehicle to explore the documents objectives, proposed methods, and the implications for the future. They are as follows,

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First, the NSS calls for pre-emptive military action against hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Second, the NSS announces that the US will not allow its global military strength to be challenged by any foreign power. Third, the NSS expresses commitment to multilateral international cooperation, but makes clear that the United States ‘will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary’ to defend national interests and security. Fourth, the NSS proclaims the goal of spreading democracy and human rights around the globe, especially in the Muslim world. (Lieber 2002:2)

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Comparative analysis between Kuglers’ findings and those of the Liebers show a directly inverse relationship. Drawing a parallel between Liebers’ first characteristic, and Kuglers’ fourth, we find both are about pre-emptive military force; Lieber recognising it’s controversial nature while Kugler denying its focus despite the current invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Similarly, Liebers’ second characteristic of ‘military primacy’ echoes Kuglers suggestion that the NSS02 is not ‘ultra-militarist’. It is difficult to understand how one could not perceive ‘ultra-militarist’ dynamics in the intention to maintain military primacy by dissuading any challengers through whatever means necessary. Lieber’s third, and Kuglers second characteristic also mirror each other; while Kugler denies the uni-lateralist tendencies underlined in NSS02, the Liebers’ attempt to disguise these tendencies as the ‘new multi-lateralism’ in which the US ‘will not hesitate to act alone’.

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And finally, the similarity between Kuglers suggestion that the NSS02 is not hegemonic in nature and the Liebers' fourth theme of the 'spread of democracy' which calls for, "a comprehensive public information campaign – 'a struggle of ideas' -- to help foreigners, especially in the Muslim world, learn about and understand America."(Lieber 2002:6). The notion implicit in NSS02 that the United States will attempt to remake the world in its own image by 'opening up societies' and installing the 'infrastructure of democracy' and 'free-markets' is unequivocally hegemonic, echoing the aspirations of Russification<sup>5</sup> and other such grand schemes of absorption of other sovereign powers under one powerful hegemonic super-state.

While Kugler remains in denial, we can utilise the Liebers' analysis as a guideline in order to gain insight into the significance of pre-emption, military primacy, the 'new multilateralism', and the 'spread of democracy' within the framework of the NSS02. It should be noted that these characteristics are similar to the departures from traditional US foreign policy pointed out earlier, a reality that will be explored in Chapter VII. The following chapters will analyse each characteristic in turn, in order to accomplish what the Liebers' attempted, that is to clearly show the consistencies between NSS02 and past NSS, and isolate areas where the new strategies depart from the past, and the implications this will have in the Middle East.

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<sup>5</sup> A process by which the Russians expanded their sphere of influence through Asia, Eastern Europe, and into Central Asia by forcing native peoples to speak the Russian language at school, work, and all government levels. Russian culture was also encouraged and enforced, along with massive annexations and forced migrations of populations so that the stronger ethnic groups were less likely to resist.

### **- Chapter III -**

#### **PRE-EMPTIVE WAR DOCTRINE**

The official introduction of pre-emptive war doctrine into US foreign and security policy has perhaps been the most controversial aspect of the Bush Administrations handling of the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> international security environment. While policy analysts and legal experts within the more traditional American and British academic institutions have scrambled ineffectively to provide a legal basis for such action in international law, there is a growing voice of dissidence both inside and outside the US questioning the legitimacy of these claims. The controversy around pre-emption spawns from Chapter Five of NSS02, in which Bush lays out the official line on the legitimacy of pre-emption under international law, and the reasoning behind the United States shift from deterrence to pre-emptive strategies. Reviewing the document, and the analysis given by leading supporters and critics of pre-emptive war policy this chapter will discuss current US military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, its implications in the Middle East, and discern for ourselves whether or not such actions are grounded in international law.

While the jury is still out on whether this new addition will provide an efficient solution to this emerging security dilemma or induce an escalation in non-state organised violence against US and other western targets, we can review the legality behind pre-emptive military action. As stated previously, one of the key dynamics that has emerged in the post-cold war era is the introduction of non-state actors with WMD posing a threat to the international security environment. Such actors, acting in unison with so-called ‘failed states’—that is the name given to states

that present a threat to US interests—have the potential of obtaining WMD and threatening the security of the US and/or its allies. This presents a fundamental shift in the security environment, where previously the only conceivable threat to US national security came from large states with great military industrial complexes potent enough to produce weapons and armies to rival the US. And now according to US government thinking, “shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” (NSS02 2002:15) As suggested by Gaddis,

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Strategies that won the cold war—containment and deterrence—won’t work against such dangers, because those strategies assumed the existence of identifiable regimes led by identifiable leaders operating by identifiable means from identifiable territories.  
(Gaddis 2003:2)

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The absence of a clearly identifiable enemy in the ‘war on terror’ blurs the situation, like guerrilla warfare on an international level, ‘the enemy’ remains elusive and among the civilian population, in many cases protected by the civilian population, and strikes with surprise before receding into the background. “How do you contain a shadow? How do you deter someone who is prepared to commit suicide?” (Ibid). The Bush Administrations answer is not an abandonment of the strategies of containment and deterrence, but rather the addition of pre-emptive military force to the list of strategies utilised in the pursuance of US national interests.

According to Chomsky, while there is a basis for pre-emptive attacks in international law, there is no such recognition legitimising pre-emptive war (Chomsky 2003:7). A pre-emptive attack could be taken under threat of ‘imminent attack’, such as in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Ironically, ignoring the insistence of his NSA and Pentagon Advisors on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Kennedy brothers resisted a pre-emptive strike and possibly saved the world from a nuclear exchange between the

two largest military super-powers (Jacobsen 1997:74). A pre-emptive war, however, is ‘a new doctrine’ announced in NSS02 that, “declares the right to attack any potential challenge to the global dominance of the United States. The potential is in the eye of the observer, so that, in effect, gives the authorisation to attack essentially anyone.” (Chomsky 2001:2) This blurs the distinction between the US using force pre-emptively to defend against an attack and the US using force to further its national interest against its adversaries. Herein lies genius behind the ‘war on terror’. A sustained intelligence and military campaign against ‘terrorism’ can be equated to the cold wars objective of defeating ‘communism’, yet even more illusive as the primary actors are not necessarily easily ‘identifiable states’ but ‘shadowy networks of individuals’. This pre-emptive approach to protecting the US from terrorism has the simultaneous effect of expanding the US sphere of influence. Under the guise of defending against terrorism, an environment is fostered for greater global US economic, social, political, and cultural monopoly.

On the other hand, the consequences of this policy might work against the US goals of limiting/eliminating ‘terrorism’ and actually escalate this global security dilemma. As Chomsky points out, “The preventive war doctrine is virtually an invitation to potential targets [of US aggression] to develop some kind of deterrent, and there are only two kinds of deterrent. One is weapons of mass destruction, the other is large-scale terror.” (Ibid) Furthermore, it has been, “pointed out over and over again by strategic analysts, the intelligence agencies and so on, so sure, it raises the danger that something will get out of control.” (Chomsky 2003:9)

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In NSS02, Bush states, “for centuries, international law recognised that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an immanent danger of attack.” (NSS02 2002:9) In this there is little dispute even among radical dissidents. However, the key pillar of Bush’s argument for the legitimacy of pre-emptive war is tenuously hinged on a perception of ‘immanent danger of attack’ in which one does not need to know the time or place of the attack. In international law, however, it is recognised that one must perceive these crucial pieces of evidence before legitimately launching a pre-emptive assault on an otherwise non-threatening state (Glennon 2003). This stands to reason; else a pre-emptive attack is the same as a straightforward offensive. Hence, proof of the intention to attack is necessary. The NSS02 abrogates responsibility for this legal requirement, stating, “we must adapt the concept of ‘immanent attack’ to [make] the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” (NSS02 2002:9) At the same time it ought to be recognised that fighting terrorism is not akin to traditional warfare. A real but elusive enemy is, through violent means, attacking US targets that are not previously identified. Yet another bi-product of the ‘war on terror’ which the NSS02 is designed to support - we must abandon international law in order to promote international law. Such methodology begs the question of whether the ends justify the means, a question that will be addressed in chapter VII.

As pointed out previously (Nicaragua) the US consistently ignores (or breaks) international laws and there appears to an abundance of support for US non-compliance. Among leading apologists for US pre-emptive war doctrine is Michael

Glennon, a top specialist on international law who argues that the institutions of international law are 'hot air' and should be ignored by the US in deciding when or where to use military force (Glennon 2003). With such reckless abandonment of the post-1945 institutional framework for international co-operation being promoted by 'leading specialists' like Glennon, the notion of international law is becoming more of an illusion to be manipulated rather than a reality to be cherished.

In many ways, it appears that the legality of the US pre-emptive war doctrine will depend very much upon how successful their war campaign is in achieving its stated objectives (Gaddis 2003). Also, international public opinion (undoubtedly shaped by media monopolies) can serve to legitimise US actions abroad. For the purposes of observation, Afghanistan and Iraq provide two recent case studies where the US has utilised pre-emptive military force in 'defending' its national security. What is immediately startling about both cases is that neither state contributed to the Sept. 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, destruction of the World Trade Centre (WTC) and both 'enemies' that the US needed to 'defend' themselves against were in some way created by the US in the first place. This needs some explaining.

If we are to believe Zbigniew Brzezinski, a national security advisor to Reagan, modern fundamentalist Islamic militarism was his creation; a bi-product of his successful bid to draw the Russians into an 'Afghan-trap' in 1979 (Chomsky 2001:13). However tenuous Brzezinski's claim, further evidence provides a clear picture of CIA involvement in training Islamic soldiers from all over the middle-east and central Asia to fight jihad, a holy war, against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Along the borders of Pakistan US special forces and CIA operatives trained these 'freedom

fighters’<sup>6</sup>, including Osama bin Laden, in the strategies and tactics needed to wage a sustained guerrilla warfare campaign against a superpower with infinitely greater weapons technology and deployment capabilities (Chomsky 2001:52).

Schools were set up to indoctrinate young children into the way of militant Islam. While children recited, ‘one dead Russian plus two dead Russians equals three dead Russians’ they were drilled and timed on taking apart and the putting back together Kalashnikov automatic assault rifles (Fisk 1986). The version of the Qur’an that they recited all day was edited of any of its peaceful content, leaving only the material that would support violence (Fisk 1986). From this spawning ground of militant Islamic revolution, the forces of jihad were unleashed on the Soviets in Afghanistan; blowing up tanks and bridges needed for manoeuvrability of massive Soviet ground forces, and limiting the Soviets ability to control territory while inflicting massive casualties. This had a devastating effect on Soviet troop moral. Afghanistan had become the Soviets Vietnam, and withdrawal became the rational option.

When the Soviets had left, however, the US turned their attention elsewhere, leaving this rag-tag crew of assorted Tajiks, Uzbeks, Afghans, and others who had fought the Soviets, now in charge of the country. Armed, trained, and abandoned by the US, these militarised Islamic elements ravaged the nation of Afghanistan for years after the Soviets retreat, the result of which was the rise of the Taliban. The horrors of the Talibans rule over Afghanistan are well documented, yet while in power they were praised by the Clinton Administration for virtually wiping out the opium trade in

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<sup>6</sup> As described in the New York Times throughout the early to mid-1980s

the region that saw a dramatic decrease of heroine on the world market. However, when the Taliban had ‘unreasonably’ asked for evidence of Bin Ladens involvement in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks before they would extradite him into US custody, the US attacked Afghanistan with military force and eliminated the Taliban establishment, replacing it with a coalition of Afghans, Uzebks, Tajiks and others referred to as the Northern Alliance. As anticipated by several analysts even prior to the US invasion, the affects on the nation have been horrific;

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Huge numbers of miserable people have been fleeing to the borders in terror after Washington’s threat to bomb the sheds of existence remaining in Afghanistan and to convert the Northern Alliance into a heavily armed military force. They naturally fear that if these forces are unleashed, now greatly reinforced, they might renew the atrocities that tore the country apart and led much of the population to welcome the Taliban when they drove out the murderous warring factions... that killed tens of thousands of civilians, also committing mass rapes and other atrocities” (Chomsky 2001:35)

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The forces of the Northern Alliance, alongside the US, presently control Afghanistan, and have predictably led much of the population to regret to fall of the Taliban as the promise of democracy remains as elusive as Osama bin Laden himself.

The US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan has been dubbed as ‘pre-emptive’ by the Bush Administration, stating that Osama Bin Laden had orchestrated the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack on the US and that he planned to commit future attacks from his base in that country.<sup>7</sup> This was the key claim to legitimacy, which fails even the most rudimentary tests of western investigatory and legal parameters. The US has, to date, provided no evidence that Osama Bin Laden had any hand in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on the US. Although Bin Laden commonly called for his fellow Muslims to attack symbols of US power, including attacks on civilians, he has never claimed responsibility for September 11<sup>th</sup>. One would think, and several

specialists including Robert Fisk<sup>8</sup> who has interviewed bin Laden in person, that if bin Laden had been involved in the attacks he would have proudly claimed his part. Instead, he has denied any direct involvement. Another oddity which defies the claims of legitimacy for 'pre-emptive force' is the fact that most of the Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> hijackers were Saudi Arabian citizens, non were from Afghanistan. This being the case, and Osama bin Laden incidentally being a Saudi national, then it would make more sense (though still would be illegitimate) for the US to attack Saudi Arabia, as was suggested by the Rand corporation, a Pentagon advisory 'think-tank'.<sup>9</sup> Such action was obviously not taken. Saudi Arabia may be a hotbed of fundamentalist Islamic militancy and a breeding ground for 'terrorists'; but it is also a key US ally and owner of the largest oil reserve on the planet (Jacobsen 1997).

The apparent military success achieved by Operation Enduring Freedom encouraged the Bush Administration to go ahead with plans to invade Iraq and secure the worlds second largest oil reserve despite the massive humanitarian disaster created in Afghanistan. The US provided several arguments for a pre-emptive attack on Iraq prior to the 2003 campaign ranging from Saddam's alleged WMD programs, including attempts at acquiring nuclear weapons, to allegations of the Iraqi regimes support for al Qa'ida, to intentions of saving the people of Iraq from a gruesome dictator who would threaten his neighbours and slaughter his own citizens. While the third argument is undoubtable, it is not a legitimate ground for pre-emptive attack as no 'immanent threat of attack' exists. No evidence has been presented by the US or the UK thus far that would legitimise the first two arguments for pre-emption.

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<sup>7</sup> Press statement made by a White House spokesperson, Ari Fliesher, on Oct29th, 2001

<sup>8</sup> Personal interview with Robert Fisk on February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2003, in a café in Beirut, Lebanon where we talked at great length about the war in Afghanistan and the 'inevitable' war in Iraq.

However, to give a proper analysis it is pertinent to inspect all the arguments for a pre-emptive war against Iraq as presented by the Bush Administration.

With regard to Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, having dispelled the diplomatic mythology behind the so-called '45 minute' clause, the jury is still out in the perception of the Bush and Blair administration, and perhaps a few of their 'silent partners' (but of course we wouldn't know) whereas the general population seem to be coming to grips with the fact that so far there are no WMD in Iraq. The confidence displayed by Bush, Powell, Rumsfeld and other US officials in presenting 'evidence' of Iraq's WMD programmes was enough to convince the American public, but not the UN, including several key players and 'great powers' such as Russia, France, Germany, and China. In one case, the pictures shown by Powell to the Security Council depicted what Powell indicated as mobile missile launchers possibly armed with WMD. Later analysis showed that the pictures were actually showing the weather balloon platforms sold to Iraq by Britain. (Chomsky 2003:61)

A scandal also arose over Bush's claim, in NSS02, that, "we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used on Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear and biological weapons." (NSS02 2002:8) when it was revealed in the media that the 'irrefutable proof' presented by the CIA was a forgery. The Nigerian government document was made out to look like Iraq was attempting to buy weapon grade uranium, a core material in a nuclear weapon. When the CIA admitted the document

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<sup>9</sup> A RAND Corporation dossier published online in 2002 suggested that the US invade Saudi Arabia before the House of Saud falls to Islamic fundamentalists

was a forgery (that somehow ‘slipped past’ their analysts), the Bush Administration quickly, yet subtly, retracted the contention that Iraq was acquiring nuclear weapons.

The British government - recognising that some resemblance of evidence must appear with regards to the ‘danger of immanent attack’ clause if there was going to be any claim to legality under existing international law - even went as far as to report that Saddam could deploy WMD within 45 minutes. This, now known as the Kelly Report, is the closest evidence put forward by either the Bush or Blair governments that would indicate that Iraq posed an ‘imminent threat of attack’ on the allies – despite the fact that there is no indication that Saddam had any intention of attacking the US or its allies unless provoked – and even this turned out to be false. While the allegations and counter allegations regarding the Kelly report remain in the hands of the Hutton Inquiry, it has become clear that the analysis of the Dr. Kelly - the leading Iraqi weapons specialist for the British Defence Department - did not perceive any ‘immanent threat’ from missiles that could be deployed within 45 minutes. Ironically, Dr. Kelly is now dead (through suspicious circumstances) and unable to verify his report to the Blair government.

Support for going to war against Iraq on the WMD allegations appear to have been thin even at home, as thirty five Representatives signed House Resolution 260, demanding that the Bush Administration provide evidence of its claims about Iraqi weapons programmes before they would support pre-emptive military action. Here are the main parts;

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Resolved, That the President is requested to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 4 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution documents or other materials in the

President's possession that provides specific evidence for the following claims relating to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction:

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- (1) On August 26<sup>th</sup>, 2002, the Vice President in a speech stated: 'simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. What he wants is time, and more time, to husband his resources to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons program, and to gain possession of nuclear weapons.'
  - (2) On September 12, 2002, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the President stated: 'Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminium tubes to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.'
  - (3) On October 7, 2002, in a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, the President stated; 'It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons
  - (4) On January 7, 2003, the Secretary of Defence at a press briefing stated: 'There is no doubt in my mind but that they currently have chemical and biological weapons.'
  - (5) On January 9, 2003, in his daily press briefing, the White House spokesperson stated: 'We know for a fact that there are weapons in Iraq.
  - (6) On March 16, 2003, in an appearance on NBC's 'Meet the Press', the Vice President stated: 'We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. El Baradei frankly is wrong.'
  - (7) On March 17, 2003, in an Address to the nation, the President stated: 'Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraqi regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.'
  - (8) On March 21, 2003, in his daily press briefing the White House spokesperson stated: 'Well, there is no question that we have evidence and information that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical particularly. All this will be made clear in the course of the operation, for whatever duration it takes.'
  - (9) On March 24, 2003, in an appearance on CBS's 'Face the Nation', the Secretary of Defence stated: ' We have seen intelligence over many months that they have chemical and biological weapons, and that they have dispersed them and that they're weaponized and that, in one case at least, the command and control arrangements have been established.'
  - (10) On March 30, 2003, in an appearance on ABC's 'This week', the Secretary of Defence stated: 'We know where they are, they are in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad.'<sup>10</sup>
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<sup>10</sup> Quote from a US government document taken from Pitt 2003:2

Thus far, none of these statements has been substantiated. With regard to the nuclear claims, as in the UK case of the Kelly Report's '45 minute' clause, the accusation was quickly withdrawn when it was discovered publicly that the key documentary evidence was a forgery. The WMD claims, however, remain dauntingly unanswered.

As more time passes it appears that Scott Ritter, the American UNSCOM inspector who publicised his findings that there was no way Iraq had the capabilities of launching weaponized WMD, nor was it likely that they possessed WMD in any considerable quantities, was probably right. After seven years of UNSCOM inspections, years of satellite surveillance, and months of intrusive UNMOVIC inspections under the guise of Dr. Hans Blix, US ground invasion and occupation of Iraq, and months of intrusive searches the US forces have found nothing to substantiate the claims of the Bush Administration as outlined above.

Where does this leave the legitimacy of pre-emptive war? The silence that lies behind this question is deafening. While the argument that Iraq fostered links with al Qaeda remain unsubstantiated, and dismissed as wishful thinking even by those who generally support the NSS02 (Nye 2003), it is appropriate to note the declaration in NSS02 with regard to the connection made between putative 'rogue' or 'failed' states, WMD, and 'terrorist' organisations. This parallel is described by Gaddis as Bushes 'first innovation' in the new NSS; the argument that 'failed states' which have the capability of manufacturing WMD could potentially pass on this technology to non-state actors for either profit or for reasons of ideological empathy (Gaddis 2003). While this dynamic is of increasing concern to all western states and merits attention, it provides little legitimacy for American pre-emptive war in Iraq for the simple

reason that Iraq had, or at least no longer had, any WMD to sell or give away. As a frustrated US Administration prepared for the inevitable ground attack on Iraq, White House officials were clinging to the last rational argument for war against Iraq; to end the suffering of the Iraqi people by riding them of the tyranny of Saddam Hussein and his regime.<sup>11</sup> While this may be appealing, the notion of a pre-emptive war on humanitarian grounds is paper thin considering atrocities of far greater magnitude are unfolding in several regions of the globe with little or no assistance.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Press statement made by White House spokesperson, Ari Fliesher, on March 14<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Amnesty International Report (2002). London, UK. Amnesty International Publications

## - Chapter IV -

### MILITARY PRIMACY

Another core element of the NSS02 is the stated intention of the US to maintain military primacy in the global security environment. The passage that has stimulated discussion amongst myriad individuals and groups, both public and private, states, “[O]ur forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.” (NSS02 2002:11) While the American government’s intention to maintain military and economic primacy by actively preventing the rise of any competitors has arguably guided foreign policy over the last century (Lieber), the objective remained assumed rather than openly stated. It appears that overtly stating this motive was in some way inappropriate during the first Bush Administration; “In 1992, a leaked Department of Defence strategic planning document offered a blueprint for precluding the rise of any peer competitor, using strikingly similar language to the current Bush NSS. (The 1992 document language was subsequently disavowed by US officials, but the basic concept was not abandoned).” (Lieber 2002:4) The document Lieber is referring to was a ‘Defence Planning Guidance’ draft disavowed by the first Bush Administration in 1992 and ironically authored by Paul Wolfowitz, the Assistant Secretary of Defence under the current Bush Administration (Gaddis).

While one cannot help but criticise the patriotic fervour of the Liebers’ arguments—one is forced to wonder whether they are writing as social scientists or proud US citizens -- for US military primacy, they raise points that deserve further

analysis. First is the fact that US military primacy is good for everybody based on the premise that, “US military presence is welcomed in a great number of areas around the globe.” (Lieber 2002:4) Second, that ‘coming out’ and stating US intention in this matter are ‘unlikely to reshape the contours of American foreign policy.’ (Ibid) And Third, that “American defence spending is likely to continue to rise with the war on terrorism” (Lieber 2002:5). While the second and the third claims appear to hold some merit, the first is entirely subjective and based on questionable premises.

The question of whether US primacy is ‘good’ or not brings us to the very heart of NSS02, and whether an American empire is good for global peace and security. While, as a westerner, this researcher can perceive the apparent benefits of a US dominated globe where our present economic system is protected and stabilized. But protected at what cost in terms of human as well as material resources? And stabilized for how long? The fact that our economic system is stabilized most often at the expense of others, the security of our future becomes more dependent on military forces to combat the violence that emerges from these ‘others’ (Rogers 2000:101). As with all empires recorded in history, the American empire proclaimed by NSS02 is being forged in war, the ‘war on terror’. This war, waged primarily on Islamic militancy, is one that can not be won by force.<sup>13</sup>

While the US military presence may be welcomed in many parts of the world, Lieber neglects to mention this is not in the sense of the UN being welcomed via the inclusive consent of all sides to a conflict, but rather welcomed by one group in a region and feared and attacked by another group in the same region. Taking sides, in

the pursuit of self-interest rather than resolving conflicts, generally leads to an escalation in the underlying dynamics of the conflict, making it more and more difficult to diffuse the situation. Somalia provides a good example of the immediate consequences of ‘taking sides’ as the American led forces put a bounty on General Aided’s head (Scahill 2002). The General was in charge of the largest military force in Mogadishu and quickly locked the Americans into a ground battle that saw several US soldiers dead and a hasty withdrawal of the UN operation in that country. A US black hawk helicopter pilot was dragged through the streets in a macabre celebration of the ‘victory’. Israeli/Palestine provides an ideal example for the long-term result of such strategic policy. While the Israelis have become completely dependent upon massive US military, economic, and political support for their illegal occupation of Palestinian and Syrian lands,<sup>14</sup> one can be sure that the Palestinians and other Arabs are not so welcoming.

Underlying the notion that ‘US primacy is, in fact, good for global peace and security’ (Lieber) one must wonder whose peace, and whose security is being referring to exactly. Certainly not the people of Afghanistan and Iraq; countries still being ravaged by American military campaigns. Perhaps by ‘global’ they mean the all-encompassing ‘international community’ referred to by the White House, which indicates the ‘free-market democracies’ of the north and their satellite economies in the south. Security of the international system which allows the American government and those who fall in line underneath it to grow more wealthy while those, in the Muslim world and elsewhere, with a different view of society and

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<sup>13</sup> This view was established through my meetings with several Hizbullah members in Lebanon, 2003, with Dr. Victoria Fontan. Also, the Palestinian’s perpetually resistant reaction to Israeli ‘counter-terrorism’ strategies furthers this point

<sup>14</sup> Israel receives more American foreign aid than every other recipient country combined.

economics become sources of insecurity that must be eliminated. Stability in the sense that the raw materials and labour of the south can continue to be exploited for the benefit of the industrialised states of the north without hindrance of indigenous revolutionary forces. From this perception, the doctrine of military primacy appears to be a proclamation of Empire. It is a *de facto Pax Romana*, except this time round it's *Pax Americana*, and the stakes remain global dominion. The Roman word '*pax*' can be directly translated as 'peace' or 'order', something to keep in mind when we are reading NSS02.

The second conclusion presented by the Liebers is that actually stating the intention of military primacy will not 'reshape the counters' of US policy is generally true, there are some distinguishable departures that merit inspection. Although this will be discussed at length in the next chapter on the 'new multi-lateralism', it needs pointing out that US foreign policy under Bush has seen the US withdrawal its support for several international treaties such as the ABM treaty, the Kyoto protocol, and the International Criminal Court (ICC), all of these serving to maintain US hegemony. Such a retreat from international consensus building through recognized international institutions is carried over into the role of the United Nations for resolving conflicts. While the US remains committed to creating 'coalitions of the willing' including 'silent partners' the role of international bodies such as the UN are sidelined and emphasis is put towards strengthening regional security regimes such as NATO and ASEAN. Already the 'rapid reaction force' Boutros Boutros Ghali, then Secretary General of the UN, so desperately urged nations to provide to the UN is being created through NATO (NSS02). Such developments suggest that the UN's role in international conflict resolution will become less of an arbiter of military

forces and more associated with the 'clean-up' after 'coalitions of the willing' have achieved their objectives.

However, one must agree with Lieber, Nye, Chomsky and others in conceding that the strategy of military primacy stated in NSS02 has been an unwritten, if not unspoken, national security objective for at least the last century. After all, from Paul Wolfowitz, presently Assistant Secretary of Defence, to Donald Rumsfeld, presently Secretary of Defence, many of the Bush Administration's staff are recycled Reaganites, and it would appear that many of their objectives remain the same, including the SDI program (Strategic Defence Initiative - now dubbed 'missile defence'), which necessitate continually increasing military budgets to bolster the 'security' of the US. These are the same people who used the US's military strength to support some of the most vicious dictators, tyrants, and terrorists of the last half-century including Saddam Hussein, Marcos, Suharto, Somoza, Duvalier, even Osama bin Laden (Chomsky 2003:3). Ironically, it was Donald Rumsfeld who was sent by the Reagan Administration as special envoy to Iraq in 1983 in order to re-establish relations (Borger 2002). The US acted quickly to have Saddam's Iraq taken from the list of 'terrorist' states so they could arm Saddam's forces to wage war against the growing threat of the Ayatollahs Iran. As it became clear that conventional weapons would not be enough to engage Iranian forces, Rumsfeld arranged shipments of chemical and biological weapons including sarin gas, bubonic plague, and anthrax to Saddam (Scahill 2002). The picture below shows Donald Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam in December 20<sup>th</sup>, 1983.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Picture found in NSA Archives, at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/>



Such irresponsible proliferation of WMD by the US government does not support the notion that US military primacy is ‘good for global peace and security’. Sponsoring international terrorism, even to the point of training Osama bin Laden in sparking the first jihad in Afghanistan and arming Saddam Hussein with WMD, only to wage war against these same forces when they turn and attack US interests has a de-stabilising effect on international relations. Despite the US’s ability to gain military and economic strength from this process, millions of dead civilians and refugees have been left in the wake.<sup>16</sup> It is from these suffering masses that terrorist organizations draw recruits.

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While Bush recognizes that there are underlying causes of terrorism, this researcher does not share Gaddis’s enthusiasm that ‘the presidents thinking parallels an emerging consensus within the academic community... despite the fact that many academics haven’t noticed yet.’ (Gaddis 2003:9) What many academics and security analysts have been pointing out is that despite Bushes insistence that September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, occurred is because terrorists 'hate freedom and democracy’, the root cause of terrorism in the Middle East appears to be attributed by many to US foreign policy itself. Bush recognizes that, “in many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the

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<sup>16</sup> Disaffected CIA analysts have estimated approximately 6million dead civilians as a result of US foreign policy since 1945. (Galtung 2002)

emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process.” (NSS02 2002:5) Yet, Bush has maintained policy with regard the US sponsored ‘peace process’ that has fuelled the Israeli/Palestinian conflict for almost the last half century, preventing Palestinian’s from obtaining their sovereignty, and consequently depriving the Israeli populace of their security as they become the primary targets of Palestinian rage (Fisk 2002). By utilising veto-power in the UN security council, the US has effectively, and single handedly in most cases, prevented several Security Council resolutions which would have seen UN peacekeepers in Israel/Palestine. In effect, the US has thus far denied to seriously address the Palestinians grievances ‘within a political process’, arguably one of the most potent causes of ‘terrorism’ in the Middle East. As Condoleeza Rice, Bush’s National Security Advisor, informs us, “in societies where legal avenues for political dissent are stifled, the temptation to speak through violence grows” (Rice 2002:6). What Rice doesn’t say is that ‘speak[ing] through violence’ is often the only voice that is heard in the west, and thus becomes chosen medium for communication.

The openly stated intention of the Bush Administration that the US will maintain military primacy is as controversial as the emerging American empire itself, and will likely remain so for some time. This strategic objective will be enhanced by the ‘war on terrorism’ that will continue to drive innovations in weapons and intelligence gathering technologies that can be tested in the field. The rapid invasions and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq have shown American military superiority, but North Korea hangs as a daunting reminder that such hostile action may not always be possible without grave consequences. On Aug. 31, 1998, North Korea test-fired the intermediate-range Taepodong I, which flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific

Ocean. The continued work on the longer range Taepodong II suggests that Pyongyang may soon have ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead on the western shores of the the US mainland. With such threat looming, the US will be better served through diplomacy than the harder military line that was taken with Iraq.

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**- Chapter V -**

THE NEW MULTI-LATERALISM

*'you're either with us or against us' (NSS02)*

The foreign and security policy approaches outlined in NSS02 have generated a range of responses claiming that it is 'one of unabashed unilateralism befitting a lone Texan Ranger' at the one end of the spectrum, and at the other that it is 'genuinely multilateralist'. A review of the document shows that in 7 of 9 chapters, 'multilateral' approaches are incorporated into strategies, revealing at least that there is a recognition that a global security strategy depends on co-operation. "We are guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations." (NSS02 2002:14) Strangely absent, however, is any mention of the role of the United Nations, which is consistently replaced with 'coalitions of the willing' and 'silent partners'. As Nye points out, "statements about cooperation and coalitions were not followed by equal discussion of institutions." (Nye 2003:2). Indeed, in many aspects, it seems that the US has elevated itself to level of authority of the UN, replacing it as global arbiter. And it appears that the successful implementation of the United States strategy hinges upon whether or not the world accepts the US in this position.

The 'new multilateralism' is one in which the US will no longer be constrained by obligations to international bodies such as the UN or the ICC. It is, in effect, a primarily unilateral approach to international relations that will accommodate

multi-lateral co-operation only when interests are common. There are several informative essays on this area of NSS02, and this paper will endeavour to cover the spectrum, from US officials such as National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of State, Collin Powell, to government specialists like the Liebers and John Lewis Gaddis, along with western academics/intellectuals like Joseph Nye, Kenneth Pollack, Noam Chomsky, and Kai Jacobsen. To begin with, attention will be directed to the official line espoused by members of the Bush Administration.

The Bush Administration's NSS02 pursues what it calls 'a new multilateralism' in which emphasis will be shifted from great power competition to that of 'co-operation among great powers'. The assessment presented by officials is that the new strategy relies on a multilateral approach while stressing that the US will act unilaterally where necessary (Armitage). "While the US will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone..." (NSS02:7) Such a posture does not suggest international compromise or consensus, as is implied by the word 'multilateral', but rather a unilateral approach which incorporates 'like minded states' which share a mutual advantage. The principle that appears to be guiding the 'new multilateralism' is that the US will try to gain support for its objectives if and where necessary but it will not compromise its objectives in order to gain their support. This is essentially a unilateralist approach with stress on acting multilaterally where necessary. This is the Russian assessment of NSS02, according to CDI (Center for Defense Information) Moscow, an American think-tank based in Washington that focuses on Russian responses to American foreign policy (Safranchuck).

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There are several well-recognized institutions of and for multilateral diplomacy. Treaties and conventions guiding international relations peacefully through co-operation and recognition of agreements with regards to trade, security, the environment, and so on. These institutions make up international law. The following three recent developments have led many to question the United State's commitment to these established legal norms. The Bush administrations withdrawal of Clintons signature from the Kyoto Protocol, the scraping of the ABM Treaty with Russia which paves the way for an updated SDI, and the refusal to join the ICC until all relevant nations have signed treaties negating the authority of the ICC over US citizens. The United State's stridently unilateralist stance on these issues has alienated several key allies, making even the Bush Administrations version of 'multilateral' policy more difficult.

This became evident when the US tried to pull the UN into another war against Iraq in 2002/2003 and immediate opposition was raised by an unusual consortium of states, both allies and new and old adversaries alike, including Germany, Russia, France, China, Egypt and other members of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The complications that followed forced the US to act outside the established international legal framework, creating a 'coalition of the willing' with the UK in order to successfully invade Iraq. This has set a worrisome precedent. After the Blix Report was presented on January 27<sup>th</sup>, 2003, and it had been verified that Iraq no longer possessed WMD, nor was it manufacturing WMD, the world could be assured of its present safety.<sup>17</sup> To ensure future security further inspections and monitoring of Iraqi facilities was suggested as the best course of

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<sup>17</sup> Through UNSCOM, the Blix Report revealed that there was no evidence of WMDs in Iraq.

action to ensure lasting peace.<sup>18</sup> With the myth of Saddam's WMD dispelled, and the objective of regime change outlawed under the Charter of the United Nations, the US decision to invade Iraq became a message to the world. The US will not respect international law, but will forcibly ensure that other nations do respect these laws. The reality that the US illegally invaded and now occupies Iraq under the unproven assumption that Iraq had been manufacturing WMD when it, in fact, had not, has an irony that shakes the underpinnings of the international system itself.

The rationale behind this discordance is linked with the US decision on how to deal with Saddams alleged WMD, or more covertly, Saddam's control over the world's second largest oil reserve. This issue highlighted the internal debate on the implementation of NSS02 dividing those who wanted to act freely of the constraints imposed by the post-1945 institutional framework to which the US was an integral part and those who wanted to remain within that framework (Nye). While the US military deployed forces to the Persian gulf in preparing to launch an attack on Iraq, James Baker and others supporting multilateral diplomacy insisted that any military action must be taken through the UN, or at least with UN approval. Failure to obtain a second UN resolution legitimising US military action resulted in abandonment of the multilateral approach and the rise of unilateralist measures. Nye divides those supporting the later course of action into two camps of unilateralist thought; the 'Jacksonians' and the 'Wilsonians'. While the 'Jacksonians' maintain a focus on military primacy and pre-emptive war to achieve US objectives, the 'Wilsonians' strive to reach the same objectives by spreading democracy to 'all corners of the globe' and 'championing the aspirations of human dignity'. This distinction is

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid

relevant not only in analysing the application of NSS02, but also in recognizing its implicitly 'unilateralist' nature in which both camps, described by Nye as the 'new unilateralists', encourage US policy to act beyond the established post-1945 institutional framework.

The argument lies between two lines of unilateralist thought on how to implement 'the new multilateralism'. Yet the implications of who dominates this argument in terms of applied policy are significant. While the US continues to utilize its military hegemony to further its national interests under the guise of self-defense, its ability to develop positive relations with other states will continue to dwindle, as was shown by dramatic decrease in allied support between the first and second gulf wars (Chomsky 2003). As Nye suggests, the Jacksonians present focus on 'hard power' in exercising military dominance, 'will undercut the implementation of the new security strategy'. Like Gaddis, Nye recognizes that the success of NSS02 crucially depends on the use of 'soft power' combined with the attractiveness of American positions.

In short, 'soft power' is described as the ability to 'attract and persuade rather than coerce', 'hard power' is recognized as 'the ability to coerce' via military and economic strength (Nye, 2003:5). While Nye's analysis is generally approving of NSS02, he clearly supports the 'Wilsonian' line encouraging the spread of democracy and human rights over the Jacksonian method, despite the former's lack of the President Wilson's emphasis on international institutions. This later exemption is cause for worry. If, as it is beginning to appear, the US does not intend use the UN as a vehicle to 'champion the aspirations of human dignity' and encourage the 'spread of

democracy’, we are treading into new waters in international relations. As Nye realizes, “in the absence of international institutions through which others can feel consulted and involved, the imperial imposition of values may neither attract others not produce soft power.” (Ibid). His concern is essentially that this approach ignores the legitimacy that multilateral relations through international institutions provide to US policy. Too much focus on NATO and ASEAN rather than more inclusive international institutions only furthers suspicions that US national security measures will be more often expressed through military force rather than diplomacy.

The excessive use of ‘hard power’ will inhibit the ability to exercise ‘soft power’, an integral tool in the neo-Wilsonian objective of ‘spreading democracy’. This is exacerbated by the Pentagon’s decision to cut back on training for peacekeeping operations in favour of, “design[ing] a military better suited to kick down the door, beat up the dictator, and go home than to stay for the harder work of building a democratic polity.” (Nye 2003:7) As experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, the style of US military occupation is doing the opposite of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of those being occupied (Fisk 2003). In fact, there is every indication that these US military occupations have increased animosity, if not toward democracy then toward a ‘democracy’ installed by the US, and increased the base from which fundamental Islamic militant groups draw recruits.

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The threat of terror has been increased by the actions of the Bush Administration. For example, intelligence agencies are pointing out that recruitment for terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda has risen very sharply since the threat to invade Iraq.... And that’s to be anticipated for good reasons. It’s understood why. (Chomsky, 2003:10)

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Within this context, the more that ‘hard’ power is exercised in the ‘war on terror’ increases the probability of not only further attacks similar to those of September 11, 2001, but an increased likelihood that such attacks might involve more sophisticated

approaches. While engaging in this cycle of violence in such a way as to promote escalation, the ‘battle for the Muslim world’ will not be realized, as Bush envisions, in ‘a struggle of ideas’, but rather in a war of as yet unknown proportions.

The new multilateralism as observed in practice indicates that US foreign policy will be less constrained by the post-1945 institutional framework while enforcing conformity to this international framework on other states. Self-declared immunity from the ICC, and dismissal of the UN system in favour of an illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq has limited American soft-power, and tarnished the attractiveness of the American position. With the occupation proving more difficult than the invasion, costing the US four billion USD per month with no sign of cessation of guerrilla attacks on US personnel and oil pipelines, it is becoming clear that the US will eventually need to get the United Nations involved if it hopes to share the burden of ‘democratising’ Iraq. If the US still hopes to use Iraqi oil to cover the cost of the invasion and occupation, they will need more help in stabilising Iraq. The irony of the US most likely having to turn to the UN for help in Iraq after having ignored the wishes of a majority of its members in the first place would not only be a sign of US weakness, but also bring relief to much of the western world, and certainly the people of Iraq. Such a backward step for the US would also indicate that when applying a unilateralist strategy that will accommodate multilateral cooperation only when necessary, the Bush Administration might find that acting multilaterally is necessary more often than previously believed.

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## - Chapter VI -

### SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY & HUMAN DIGNITY

The final pillar of NSS02 is the intention to ‘expand the circle of [western] development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy’, and this throughout ‘every corner of the world. This is to be achieved through an ambitious target, to ‘double the size of the worlds poorest economies within a decade’ through co-operation with the IMF and the World Bank, institutions whose efforts have arguably made the worlds poorest economies even more impoverished through US-influenced planning (Jacobsen 2002). While Bush refers to monetary assistance offered to poor states as incentives to ‘democratise’, the reasoning behind the process of spreading democracy causes to other forms of ‘nation building’. The notion that ‘failed’ states provide havens for ‘terrorist’ organizations, and may provide them with WMD, gives rise to a range of policies that are ‘legitimised’ under the pretence of spreading democracy, including the pre-emptive war doctrine supporting military action against ‘failed’ states that are either run by ‘tyrants’, or those that may develop their own WMD, or proliferate WMD to non-state actors (NSS02). The assumption is that ‘spreading democracy’ throughout the world, creating global free-trade, will eradicate the underlying causes of terrorism, and thus proves to be a vital component of the ‘war on terror’ (Grimmett). One may question whether spreading democracy and free-trade, even at those regions who do not necessarily want them, is being done out of national security or national interest, a distinction suspiciously blurred in NSS02.

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The notion of promoting democracy is a resurrection of the Wilsonian notion of ‘making the world safe for democracy’ with the added intention of ‘making’ all states conform to the norms of the ‘free-market democracy’ model espoused by the US. Emphasis evolved from protecting democracy in the Wilsonian era to enforcing a reformation of ‘failed states’ or states ruled by ‘tyrants’ through democratisation and opening said state’s economies to foreign investment. The argument being that putative ‘failed states’ and those ruled by ‘tyrants’ are breeding grounds for terrorist recruiting and training(NSS02). While it can be conceded that states adverse to US foreign policy, especially the policies unveiled in NSS02, in some cases appear to be both home-bases or recruiting grounds for ‘terrorism’, one must question the American labelling such states as ‘rogue’ or ‘failed’. What are the characteristics of a ‘failed’ or ‘rogue’ state? The premise of NSS02 is that such states are defined either by tyrannical dictators who abuse the human rights of their own citizens, or states that are presently acquiring technologically advanced weaponry (such as chemical, biological, and nuclear devices), or states that harbour and/or protect those individuals and organisations the US considers ‘terrorists’. If we follow the first line of argument that tyrannical military dictators abusing human rights indicates a ‘failed’ state, then ‘failed’ states would include key US allies including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and a host of others across Latin America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, Africa and elsewhere. As this point has been explained at great length elsewhere in this paper, we can discard the first premise as false, unless there is indication that the US will be invading Israel or Indonesia to impose democracy and human rights.

Turning attention to the second argument, that ‘failed’ states are characterised by their policies of acquiring WMD, we find a peculiar blend of contradictions,

double standards. If states acquiring WMD are ‘failed states’, then along with Iran, North Korea, and others we can add the US, UK, France, Russia, Israel, India, Pakistan, etc. Obviously the US is not suggesting, that all states acquiring WMD are ‘rogue’ or ‘failed’, just those states that are averse to American foreign policy. Thus, states like Israel that abuse human rights<sup>19</sup>, defy democratic norms, and acquire nuclear weapons are not ‘failed’ because they support US foreign policy objectives, while states like Iran, working on a semi-democratic model of religious fundamentalism comparable with Israel’s, are labelled ‘failed’ precisely because they oppose US policy and develop WMD to protect themselves from US aggression.

Their fear is rational; more rational than the fear of Iraq, Iran, Syria, or North Korea attacking the US is the fear that the US will attack these countries. Afghanistan and Iraq serve as examples, as neither of these countries had attacked the US prior to the recent US invasion and occupation of those countries. Thus, it is rational for states like North Korea, Iran, Syria and others designated by the US for future wars to arm themselves in defence. While North Korea’s nuclear weaponry remains a ‘crisis’ for the US, such military power retained by North Korea will undoubtedly prevent the massive US military build-up in South Korea from being unleashed on its northern neighbour. While the acquisition of nuclear technology remains out of grasp for poorer states like Syria or Iran, developing WMD at a much cheaper rate becomes the available military option. Contrary to the hordes of academic apologists for US policy, it remains unclear why the US and its allies can ‘legitimately’ manufacture and utilize advanced WMD and others, specifically those averse to US policy can not.

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<sup>19</sup> Human Rights Watch lists Israel as one of the worst offenders of human rights

This contradiction was highlighted by the US and other western state's claim that for Iraq to use WMD against invading US/UK ground forces would be illegitimate, and would perhaps be responded to with nuclear weapons.<sup>20</sup> The fact that France refused to enter the war against Iraq unless Iraq used WMD against US/UK forces gave further legitimacy to this claim. Yet, in US defence doctrine, the US retains the right to use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons against any military force invading the US. The dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 established this policy. Why, then, do most western states fail to recognize the same rights to all other states, including those whose political structures and ideologies are different to those in the west? The answer is clearly outlined in NSS02 with the intention to conquer these states and incorporate them into the American empire. "The world, quite literally, must be made safe for democracy, even those parts of it, like the Middle East, that have so far resisted that tendency." (Gaddis 2003:3) It is likely that the US does not wish these 'failed' states to develop WMD because the US does not want these states to be able to defend themselves against US aggression.

The fear that these weapons would proliferate from 'failed' states to non-state actors is, although rational, not backed by evidence of this actually happening. The only indication might perhaps be the Japanese terrorist organisation (Aum Shinrikyo) that released poison gas on the Tokyo subway. Fears have been heightened by US officials from a host of department's warnings of immanent 'terror attacks', yet there is little indication that 'failed states' are passing on WMD to non-state actors. Thus far, 'terrorist' attacks on US targets have been relatively crude bombs made from common materials, and delivery devices have been common civilian vehicles such as

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<sup>20</sup> This threat was implied by President Bush (Senior) in the lead-in to Operation Desert Storm

boats, as in the Yemen attack on a US destroyer, or planes as were used in the September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 attacks.

Looking at the historical record of proliferation of WMD, we find that there is more likelihood of the US inadvertently proliferating WMD than any 'failed' state. As the leading global arms dealer, and representing nearly half of the world's military expenditures (Nye), the US is the most responsible for the proliferation of military hardware. Even if Iraq, as a 'failed' state, did proliferate WMD, perhaps selling them to Iran or Syria, or giving them to the frustrated Palestinians, who would be responsible? While the US accuses Iraq of proliferating WMD to non-state actors, the fact that it was the US who sold Saddam his first chemical and biological warheads leaves us with the reality that there were no WMD in Iraq before the US put them there. (Saddam eventually used these WMD against his own citizens in northern Iraq in attempts to crush the Kurdish drive for independence. He was the key US ally in the war against Iran, so atrocities were ignored and Saddam remained a key US ally in the Middle East until 1990.) The US developed the most advanced WMD such as Sarin and VX gas, and manufactured these chemical and biological materials in mass quantities, building complex delivery systems to detonate them over enemy targets. Then the US put these weapons of mass destruction directly into the hands of Saddam Hussein, a tyrannical dictator who was abusing the human rights of his citizens.

There is widespread agreement behind Liebers reiteration of NSS02s evaluation that, "the fundamental cause of radical Islamic terrorism lies in the absence of democracy, the prevalence of authoritarianism, and the lack of freedom and opportunity in the Arab world." (Lieber 2002:8). Yet, there is little irony lost on most

Arabs that it is the Americans who wish to bring democracy to the Middle East. They clearly perceive US foreign policy as preventing the occurrence of democracy in the region through US support for military dictatorships and harsh regimes such as those found in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Kuwait, Egypt and others. “Why would the US want to bring democracy to the Middle East now, when all it has offered in the past is support for violent dictators who would give the United States access to cheap oil while our people starved with no hope?”<sup>21</sup> There is historical amnesia behind statements like, “... the exercise of American power goes hand in hand with the promotion of democracy.” (Nye 2002:12). This is certainly not the case in most of the world, where the US has suppressed democratic norms in favour of protecting its national interests through support, and often the creation, of military dictatorships that commonly violate the human rights of the populace (Chomsky 2001).

Skipping over the examples of Cuba (Batista), Guatemala (ousting Jacobo Arbenz), El Salvador, Nicaragua (Somoza), Panama (Noriega), Chile (Pinochet), Israel (and the occupied territories of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt), Egypt (Sadat), Lebanon (Gemayel), Kuwait, Iraq (Saddam), Iran (the Shah), Indonesia (Suharto), Philippines and so on; there are several recent examples under the present Bush Administration of this consistent disdain for democracy. For example, US support for the ban on elections in Pakistan at the outbreak of Operation Enduring Freedom, the US invasion of Afghanistan. With the majority of Pakistan’s citizens being Muslim, General Musharraf’s ardent support for the US operation prior to the national elections would inevitably have led to an end to his rule. The Muslim

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<sup>21</sup> From a recorded interview with Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze sect in Mouktara, Lebanon, February 8<sup>th</sup>, 2003

population of Pakistan was clearly against the US ‘crusade’<sup>22</sup> against their fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. Thus, with full US support, General Musharraf cancelled elections, favouring military dictatorship rather than democracy. The US in this case had made a country that was democratic into a military dictatorship in order to use it as a base to invade that countries neighbour.

The recent coup attempt in Venezuela against President Chavez, an operation allegedly funded and supported by the US through clandestine channels (Ackman), is another primary example of the Bush Administrations blatant disdain for democracy. Having been elected by the majority of Venezuelan citizens, Chavez proceeded to nationalise the countries oil industry that had been previously run by US multi-nationals. Such an act of sovereignty in the US’s ‘back yard’ was unacceptable for the Bush Administration, who gathered anti-Chavez Venezuelan leaders in Washington to discuss the problem. Days later, several of those who visited Washington attempted a *coup d’etat*, arresting Chavez and imprisoning him (Ackman). The US, along with many western allies, welcomed the ‘change in government’ without recognizing that it was a coup d’etat. Traditional western media outlets facilitated the myth by reporting a ‘change in government’, enforcing the illusion that the *coup* came about through a democratic process rather than a hostile takeover. When support for the coup failed within Venezuela, and Chavez emerged from prison to reclaim his leadership, the US condemned him as ‘undemocratic’ while the CIA continued operations to undermine his rule (Ackman). These practices have been the norm in Latin America, and there are volumes of notable examples relating to US prevention of democracy throughout the region.

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<sup>22</sup> Bush, possibly out of strategy, but more likely out of ignorance, called the war on Afghanistan a ‘crusade’, a term that in collective Islamic historical memory reveals the intentions of Christianity

Returning the focus to the Middle East, US respect for democracy is highly visible in dealing with Israel/Palestine, as George Bush had several personal meetings with Israeli leader Ariel Sharon (a man responsible for the massacre of thousands of Palestinian women and children at Shatila and Sabra concentration camps in Beirut in 1985)<sup>23</sup>, while refusing to meet Palestinian leader Arafat on grounds that he was involved in terrorism. This begs the question whether resistance to Israeli occupation is ‘freedom fighting or ‘terrorism’. When Palestinians held their (monitored) national elections, Arafat won by a landside majority. Bush still refused to meet with him, stating that the Palestinians would have to choose someone more to the US’s liking. Frustrated and humbled through suffering, the Palestinians put forth Mohammed Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, and while he has been accepted by Bush, it is growing more likely that he will not be accepted by the Palestinian people, not the resistance/terrorist organisations such as Hamas and PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad). The fact that Abu Mazen must obtain informal approval from Arafat in the first place is enough to reveal the irony of the situation. The US cannot build a ‘roadmap to peace’ while actively supporting Israel and undermining the Palestinians. Any real attempts at peace will be all inclusive, bringing in Hamas, PIJ, and other militant groups including leaders of the Zionist settlements and their supporters in Israel proper. These are the factions of each community which are at the centre of the escalating violence in Israel/Palestine, and they must be included in any ‘road map’ to peace else there will never be peace.

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conquering Islam. The statement was quickly withdrawn, though the ramifications are incalculable.

<sup>23</sup> Sharon was indicted by a Belgian court on war crimes, though the country changed its laws so that foreigners could no longer be tried for in the court if the crime was not acted out in Belgium. While the case against Ariel Sharon is well documented and remains valid, it is unlikely that the US will break with its long-standing pro-Israel policy and allow any such trial. (Interviews with Chibili Malat, a Lebanese lawyer who was attempting to prosecute Sharon, in Beirut, Lebanon, February 2003)

A further undermining factor in ‘the spread of democracy’ and ‘human dignity’ lies in Chapter 9 of NSS02 in which the strategies for transforming US national security institutions ‘to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century’ are clearly outlined (NSS02 2002:16). While there is scarce mention of ‘homeland security’, or the vast apparatus of the newly created Department of Homeland Defence, what little Bush does mention of securing US national territory is cause for concern. “At home, our most important priority is to protect the homeland for the American people. Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing” (NSS02 2002:17). If Bush is foreshadowing a future in which the US government exercises domestic policy resembling its present foreign policy than US citizens are in for a shock. Elements of this are emerging with the introduction of **The Patriot Act**, a piece of legislation passed under the Bush Administration after September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, that severely undermines constitutional rights in the name of domestic security. Under the auspices of **The Patriot Act** the Department of Justice retains the right to arrest Americans and non-nationals alike, detain them indefinitely without providing any evidence of guilt, without pressing charges, and without access to their families or legal council, until the ‘war on terror’ is over. Civil rights groups and activists have been lining up to voice dissent against these distinctly un-American policies that threaten the very principles of democracy and freedom that they claim to uphold, and even promote. There have been a few analogies drawn quite appropriately to ‘McCarthyism’, where civil liberties were set aside in order to crush the communist political movement in the US through unconstitutional methods not unlike those presented in **The Patriot Act**.

In quoting Winston Churchill, a bust of whom Bush ‘cherishes’, Chomsky reveals the significance behind the growing concern over the Patriot Act. As

Churchill stated, “for a government to put a person in prison without trial by his peers is in the highest degree odious, and the foundation of all totalitarian governments, whether Nazi or Communist.” (Chomsky 2003:7) The relevance is not only in what Churchill said, but even more so in when he said it. In 1943, even with Germany at the height of its military domination over all of Europe and building its forces for an inevitable invasion of Great Britain, Churchill condemned similar proposals by his cabinet as those put forth under the Patriot act. Despite the fact that the most powerful military force the world had ever witnessed was surrounding and intending to occupy and assimilate Great Britain into the Third Reich, Churchill still declared that such intrusive domestic practices were ‘the foundation of all totalitarian governments’ and dismissed their validity. When one compares the situation Churchill faced against an actual ‘imminent threat of attack’ by a military superpower with the situation George Bush found himself in after September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the actions of the later not only appear over zealous, but also show a distinct ‘McCarthyian’ aversion to civil liberties. The harsh infringement of articles of the constitution, notably ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘freedom of association’, under **The Patriot Act** are far more extensive than national security requires.

While the NSS02 strays from a strategic premise underlined in NSC Memorandum 68 by promoting rather than demoting ‘idealistic slogans’ such as human rights and democracy, it appears that these principles remain ‘idealistic slogans’ in the perception of the Bush Administration, if not in words than in the practice of US foreign policy. Not mentioning the questionable electoral circumstances by which Bush claimed the Presidency, the past record of US promoting democracy internally or externally does not provide a credible resume for the task. The forced application of democracy on the Middle East requires an

integrity that the US does not possess. As recently stated by Boutros Boutros Ghali, ex-Secretary General of the UN,

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They [America] cannot be the policeman of the world. One, because the public opinion will not accept this role, and, second, because they do not have the capacity. You may have war tomorrow between North and South Korea. It is practically impossible even for the superpower to get involved in all the international disputes.<sup>24</sup>

If the US wishes the world to receive it as the champion of democracy and human dignity, reliance on exercising hard power in pursuance of unilateral interests must be replaced with an equal enthusiasm for utilizing soft power initiatives in a notably more multilateral environment.

## NSS02: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST:

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Before all else I believe that international theory only progresses when voices of authority are engaged by voices that go against the grain. Some might see this to be the ruin of a good finish, others the scar of a new branch of knowledge. But for those who still prefer their international theory to come in straight planks, I end this introduction with Isaiah Berlin misquoting Immanuel Kant: 'Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.' (Der Derian 1995:3)

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Having reviewed the strategic objectives of the new NSS02 through innovations regarding pre-emptive war doctrine, military primacy, the new multilateralism, and spreading democracy, the implications for the Middle East will be considered. The stated intention to 'spread' democracy throughout the region has been followed up by the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which are presently occupied and administrated by the US. With US troops being ambushed in Iraq, and the UN remains unable to help due to the United States desire to maintain command, some are beginning to wonder if the new US approach is working. Will the US be able to achieve the objective of spreading democracy throughout the Middle East? Are the four main pillars described in NSS02 the right tools for the job? Those presenting alternative methods to achieve the same ends, such as Johan Galtung and Kai-Frithhof Jacobsen of TRANSCEND, argue that the unilateral and militant nature of US policy serves only to exacerbate the underlying causes of terrorist activity (Galtung & Jacobsen). If this is so, then continued US efforts in the region will only escalate the cycle of violence and increase the chances of a terrorist attack on targets within the western world.

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<sup>24</sup> Interview on BBC Radio 4, Monday August 24<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

The events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, became a catalyst for an evolution in international relations, especially in the field of peace and security. The strategy and tactics utilised by non-state actors, and the use of commercial passenger jets to destroy the particular and pre-determined targets, foreshadows a new era of unconventional war. Terrorism has become the first major crisis facing the US in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In Chinese, the symbol for the word crisis also means opportunity. The Bush Administration has managed to utilise the insecurity created on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, as an opportunity to implement the most comprehensive national security strategy the US has ever put forward. Not since NSC Memorandum 68 has the US been so forthright in forcing the worlds system of states to conform to the US 'grand strategy' or become obstacles that will be subverted, removed, or destroyed.

This research has examined the four main pillars of the NSS02 and has provided an insight into the intentions of US. The practical application of these pillars in the Middle East points to the pursuance of an American Empire. Having investigated the significance of NSS02 through its main pillars of pre-emptive war doctrine, military primacy, the 'new multilateralism', and the spread of democracy, it is perceived that these mechanisms will clash with militant Islamic organisations found in many regions of the world, many of which are legitimate resistance groups fighting foreign occupation. The Chechens struggle from post-Soviet dominion, while Hamas encourages the intifada in the Israeli occupied territories of the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip, Hizbullah emerges victorious after forcing an end to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 2000, and others. Many Islamic resistance organisations are labelled as 'terrorists' while they fight impossible odds against massive military regimes that consistently terrorise resisters within civilians

populations (Said 2003). The same applies whether we are referring to the Israelis in Palestine or the Russian's in Chechnya. Yet, it remains unclear why the Russians, (in Chechnya), the Israelis (in Palestine), or the Americans (in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere) can legitimately use collective punishment against civilian populations in occupied territories, while those who legitimately struggle for autonomy over their native lands are called 'terrorists' for applying the same strategy. This double standard with regards to who is accountable and who is not accountable to international law appears to be legitimised by the disproportion of military force that exists between the occupiers and the occupied. While the Israelis, Russians, and US forces utilise satellite guided bombs, air-forces and navies, with tanks, air-craft carriers and submarines armed with nuclear SLBM's, the Palestinians throw rocks, and when they get the opportunity, their fighters strap C-4 explosives to their bodies and detonate them in urban areas to achieve maximum damage to Israeli civilians.

Launching a missile from a Black Hawk helicopter (a common tool for Israeli targeted assassinations of Palestinian political and military leadership) into civilian populations in the Palestinian territories has a similar effect to a C-4 blast that kills Israelis in a marketplace or public bus (Fisk 2002). The main difference is that the Israelis have superior military force, and the Palestinians, in turn, have little else except their will to resist occupation and a need/desire to reclaim their native homeland. This situation is similar to the Russian occupation of Chechnya and the US occupation of Iraq. If we are to follow the American definition of terrorism as stated by Congress, then we should recognise all terrorists acts as such, and not only those acts which are adverse to US policy, in this case those of the Palestinians, Afghans, Chechens, and the list goes on.

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The counter-terrorist strategies developed by the U.S. (and its western allies) fail to address the root causes of ‘terrorism’ and as such only serve to exacerbate civil unrest – the most extreme form of which is ‘terrorism’. This alongside widespread US military occupation of key resources in the Middle East, while perpetually threatening others in the region who don’t ‘play ball’ (Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iran), has augmented a particular brand of resistance embedded in the Islamic faith.<sup>25</sup> The more military might the US bring to bare on the situation, the more radical and legitimate militant Islamic organizations appear to become. This could have the detrimental effect of forcing an evolution of fundamental Islamic militancy throughout the Muslim world, resulting in an escalation in violence and civil unrest. Ironically, the stated US intention of spreading democracy in the region has resulted, perhaps only in the short term, increased hardships and insecurity for the peoples of the Middle East. However, it is just possible that US counter-terrorism policies will succeed in keeping the pot of Islamic fundamentalism from boiling over until US fashioned ‘democracies’ with ‘open societies’ and ‘free markets’ have been established. At the same time, the non-stated US intentions with respect to securing access to the regions oil is undoubtedly playing a decisive roll in determining US counter-terrorism policies.

Despite the varying degrees of approval, admonition and out right dissidence regarding US policy towards the Middle East, there has been a common supposition throughout the body of literature on the issue. In short, the assessment of many Washington officials and NSS02 pundits is that the success in implementing the new national security strategy will largely depend on the degree of US military success in

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<sup>25</sup> Recorded interview with Robert Fisk in Beirut, Lebanon, February 2003

Iraq, and the US ability to pacify the local population under a US- sponsored democratic government. Gaddis takes this a step further when he suggests that the success of NSS02 depends upon being ‘welcomed’ rather than ‘shot at’ by the Iraqi population(Gaddis 2002:8). The US is standing in defiance of other great powers, the UN, international law, and international public opinion. A decisive military operation followed up by humanitarian aid to the Iraqi population and the instalment of a democratic government is necessary. Such a vast array of disapproval and uncertainty surrounding the US intention to invade Iraq needed to be answered with confidence and success. The US population and the international community at large would not tolerate a long and dragged out military campaign that could, and still might, escalate into a regional war beyond the borders of Iraq.

At present, August 24, 2003, the US forces appear to be achieving their objectives with the UN Security Council recently accepting the US-sponsored Iraqi National Council (INC) as the legitimate governing body over Iraq since Saddam and his Ba’ath regime were ousted by the US.

The battle for Iraq was expedient, with surprisingly little resistance in the form of the urban guerrilla warfare that was expected in Baghdad and other major cities. With overwhelming US and UK forces successfully capturing key installations within weeks, and securing control over all Iraqi territory in a few short months, the aftermath of the war is proving to be a far more difficult task. Since Bush declared an end to the conflict on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2003, over 140 US soldiers have been killed in what the US has finally recognised publicly as a sustained guerrilla war against US ground forces by combatants dressed as civilians. Secretary of Defense,

Donald Rumsfeld, has claimed repeatedly that the source of the attacks emanate from former Saddam loyalists, but as the ambushes and suicide attacks continue, it is appearing much more likely that these guerrilla attacks are being carried out by militant Islamic factions unrelated to the former dictator (Fisk 2003). It is also likely that we did not witness the major urban war scenario in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities because Saddam, who governed a secular state, kept a very tight lid on militant Islam in Iraq. Although Saddam certainly encouraged the intifada in Israel/Palestine, offering 15,000 USD to those families who have sacrificed a member for a martyr/suicide operation, he would not tolerate any nuisance at home.<sup>26</sup> Perhaps now that Saddam is on the run, if not dead, the largely Shia Muslim population of Iraq will prove fertile ground for resistance to US occupation.

The bombing of the vital oil pipeline coming out of Kirkuk,<sup>27</sup> which was just recently fixed from damages caused during the war, is one of several incidents that foreshadow consistent strikes against US interests in the region. Resistance to US military occupation of Iraq does not appear to be dissipating despite increased US efforts to stabilise the situation (Fisk 2003). In fact, it appears that continued US efforts to find Saddam, and find those responsible for the recent attacks has only served to exacerbate the situation, creating an atmosphere of fear and loathing between US ground forces and the general population. Even many of those who had previously encouraged the US invasion, and welcomed the ousting of Saddam and his tyrannical regime in exchange for US occupation, are now insisting that the US must leave Iraq.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> BBC Newsworld Report, March 4<sup>th</sup>, 2003

<sup>27</sup> USA Today, June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2003. accessed at [http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-06-22-iraq-oil\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-06-22-iraq-oil_x.htm)

<sup>28</sup> Channel 4 News, July 29<sup>th</sup>, 2003

Perhaps the most decisive diplomatic victory, underplayed until the Security Council's endorsement of the US-sponsored INC, was the US success in getting Shia Muslim delegates involved in the new Iraqi government. The group led by Sayeed Hakim, represents roughly sixty percent of the Iraqi population. Any hope for a democratic government cannot exclude a majority of the population. With an Islamic government ruling predominantly Shia Muslim Iran right next door, the potential for civil war in Iraq would be drastically increased if the Shia Muslims of southern Iraq were excluded from forming the new Iraqi government. Iraq's Shia Muslims expressed strong reservations to joining a US-sponsored government. It also remains unclear whether or not the Shia Muslim presence on the INC will have any effect on deterring guerrilla style attacks against the US and UK targets.

From a broader perspective one might want to probe the question of why the US is so interested in Iraq in the first place. Under the auspices of NSS02, US planners elected for military engagement in the Middle East in an effort to solidify political and economic influence in the region. In pursuing this objective it was envisioned that,

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Iraq is the most feasible place we can strike the next blow. If we can topple this tyrant... we can accomplish a great deal. We can complete the task that the Gulf War left unfinished. We can destroy whatever weapons of mass destruction Saddam Hussein may have accumulated since. We can end whatever support he's providing terrorists elsewhere, notably those who act against Israel. We can liberate the Iraqi people. We can ensure an ample supply of inexpensive oil. We can set in motion a process that could undermine and ultimately remove reactionary regimes elsewhere in the Middle East, thereby eliminating the principal breeding ground for terrorism. We can save [the UN] from the irrelevance into which it will otherwise descend if its resolutions continue to be contemptuously disregarded. If I am right about this, then it's a truly grand strategy. What appears at first glance to be a lack of clarity about who's detorable and who's not turns out, upon closer examination, to be a plan for transforming the

entire Muslim Middle East: bringing it, once and for all, into the modern world. (Gaddis 2003:5)

This 'distinctly American internationalism' is embodied within NSS02. The various articles appearing in the two leading international relations journals, *Foreign Policy* and *Foreign Affairs*, have tended to be both supportive and critical of this 'distinctly American internationalism'. However, the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> seem to have disturbed many academics (most notably American and British) ability to present a critical analysis of US national security policy. A primary example can be found in *Foreign Affairs* March/April 2002 article by Kenneth Pollack entitled *Next Stop Baghdad?* that should have been entitled *Next Stop Baghdad!* due to the highly propagated nature of the writing. Pollack's article reads more like a State Department press release rather than a serious academic analysis. "What should the United States do about Iraq... the United States has no choice left but to invade Iraq itself and eliminate the current regime" (Pollack 2003:1). All this in the first paragraph, with the claim that, "the one strategy that offers a way out of this impasse. The United States should invade Iraq, eliminate the current regime, and pave the way" for a pro-US government (Ibid). Apparently, Pollack would have us believe that there are no alternative courses of action available for dealing with Saddam Hussein. The notion is, of course, absolutely ridiculous. Many alternatives have been presented by various state and non-state actors within the United Nations itself, and this alongside massive international NGO lobbying for alternative measures.

However, we are playing into Pollacks hands by assuming his first question has any merit. "What should the United States do about Iraq?" The question is similar to, what should Canada do about Iraq? Or what should China do about Iraq? If asked such questions we would invariably laugh, and ask what Canada/China has to

do with Iraq. What right does the US have to 'do' anything about Iraq, a nation that poses no threat, and has been shown incapable of threatening the national security of US? If China were to publicly announce that it would bi-pass the United Nations and invade Iraq, with a coalition of willing states (lets say Russia and India) with the intention of replacing the current regime with a pro-Asian government hand picked by Beijing. How would the world react? As preposterous as this appears, this is what the US has done. What Pollack has suggested is not only short sighted, it is a flagrant violation of international law including several articles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Beyond this, and given the benefit of hindsight, Pollack's assessment of the situation is clearly wrong. He writes that the so-called 'doves' are, "wrong to think that inspections and deterrence are adequate responses to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs." (Pollack 2002:2) As it turns out, the intrusive inspections by UNMOVIC and its predecessor UNSCOM appear to have done their job so well that by the time the US invaded Iraq in April 2003, there were no WMD. In fact, months after the invasion, and thousands of civilian deaths, callously referred to as 'collateral damage', the only chemical, biological, or radioactive weapons material to be discovered in Iraq were the depleted uranium (DU) shell casings fired by the US forces at Iraqi targets in 1991 (and again in 2003). The effects of depleted uranium exposure has led to a dramatic four hundred percent increase in cancer in southern Iraq (Fisk 2000:93).

While there has been some progress with regards to showing DU causing 'Gulf War syndrome' in allied personnel who participated in operation 'Desert

Storm', there has been no allied inquiry into the cause of dramatic increases in cancer occurring in Iraq since 1991. As Robert Fisk discovered, at the test range at Eskmeals (UK) DU shells are fired into a special chamber that is fitted with several mechanisms to prevent contamination. (Fisk 2000:94) According to the Department of Environment, over ninety percent of the total weight of DU shells fired at Eskmeals have been recovered. (Ibid) After over a decade, not one of the tens of thousands of DU shells fired on Iraqi soil have been recovered by the allies. There are apparently no plans for future recovery by the US or UK. Pollack, like many other western academics, has chosen to ignore the reality that the US/UK forces are the only combatants to utilise WMD in Iraq over the last decade, favouring the myth of Iraqi WMD threatening the world. Pollacks assessment, riddled with inaccuracy and patriotic bravado, deserves no further discussion.

In opposition to academics like Pollack, Nye, and Gaddis who support the new NSS02 initiatives there is a growing body of academics, intellectuals, diplomats, activists, and others insisting that there are alternative approaches to promoting democracy, human dignity, and a lasting international peace that do not involve military force. A leader among many in this movement is Johan Galtung, founder of TRANSCEND and advisor to many governments and organisations in the area of non-violent conflict transformation. It is interesting to note that Galtung does not use the term conflict 'resolution', as within the TRANSCEND philosophy conflict is naturally occurring and not necessarily negative. It is how we deal with conflict that makes it either positive or negative, and according to Galtung, using violence to 'resolve' a conflict only exaggerates the negative qualities of conflict while suppressing the rise of positive qualities (Galtung 2002). TRANSCEND is the pillar

of the newly emerging Global Peace University in Oslo and has been modified into a manual for the United Nations. This model is quickly becoming more noticed among policy makers, especially in Europe where anti-war campaigns are making it more difficult for governments to use military force in settling conflicts abroad. As this new approach to assessing, mediating, and resolving conflict is based on non-violent responses, it clearly stands in contrast to the methods espoused in the Bush Doctrine. Yet, the goals of liberty, democracy, and human dignity remain very similar.

**- Chapter VIII -**

CONCLUSIONS

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When asked what he thought of western civilisation, Muhatma Gandhi replied, “it’s a good idea!” Gandhi’s sardonic comment may find more resonance today than

at any other time during western civilisation. The new National Security Strategy of the United States of America is perceived by the Bush Administration as an efficient strategy for affecting the prevailing social, political, and economic climate in the Middle East. The application of these policies has seen increased US military presence in the region, including the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and heightened civil unrest throughout the Muslim world. US policy under Bush indicates an emerging American empire, observed in the self-declared immunity from the ICC, the obvious disdain for working within the post-1945 institutional framework, and the stated policy of maintaining military primacy even through (illegal use of) pre-emptive war doctrine. Having achieved the strategic objectives of NSC Memorandum 68 to maintain over 50% of the world's wealth while having less than 9% of the global population, the US is now asserting its dominance in order to expand this disparity through the implementation of the four main pillars of NSS02.

In NSS02 the US has proclaimed its intention to dominate the globe and impose the infrastructure of 'free-markets' and 'democracy' on all states, through incentives where possible, or coercion, including military force, where 'necessary' (and plausible). The implication is that the US will pursue a strategic policy labelled as a 'distinctly American internationalism' that not only protects the international system of states, but also works to 'better' them in some way. This will be achieved through the implementation of the four main pillars of NSS02: pre-emptive war doctrine, military primacy, the 'new' multilateralism, and spreading democracy. A great deal of scepticism remains, however, especially in the Middle East, with regards to the US's commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights given their track record. And several key US allies have openly expressed outrage over Bush's

pre-emptive war doctrine, most notably Germany and France, creating a divide, however temporary, in the unity of the western alliance.

Gaddis's assessment that the new NSS02 is the most significant reformulation of the US 'grand strategy' since the inception of NSC Memorandum 68 has merit. The notable departures from previous strategic policy described above as the four pillars of NSS02 have revealed a more openly aggressive US foreign policy. Yet, in some ways, these apparent departures are superficial, as they existed as unspoken objectives of US national security before being openly stated in NSS02. Military primacy, for example, has arguably been an integral aspect of US security doctrine throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Other departures from previous strategic thinking, such as promoting democracy and human dignity, are observably more nominal than practice. US insistence on the legitimacy of pre-emptive war doctrine is also arguably an extension of the continued strategic necessity to legitimise US military and covert interventions abroad. In the end it appears that the NSS02, rather than straying from the strategic objectives adopted in NSC Memorandum 68, has merely increased the aggressiveness of the US stance given its new found global military and economic supremacy. The intention of maintaining the US's 'position of disparity' in wealth *per capita* has evolved into the expansion of this disparity, increasing, rather than diminishing, the ever expanding gap between the richest and poorest nations of the world.

While there is a basis for pre-emptive attacks in international law, there is no such recognition legitimising pre-emptive war, as was recognized by the members of the UN in their decision not to use force, or condone the use of force, against

Saddam's Iraq in 2003. The US and UK provided several arguments for a pre-emptive war on Iraq prior to the 2003 campaign ranging from Saddam's alleged WMD programs, including attempts at acquiring nuclear weapons, to allegations of the Iraqi regimes support for al Qa'ida, to intentions of saving the people of Iraq from a gruesome dictator who would threaten his neighbours and slaughter his own citizens. No evidence has been presented by the US (or the UK) thus far that would legitimise these arguments for pre-emption.

This pre-emptive approach to protecting the US from terrorism conveniently has the simultaneous effect of expanding the US sphere of influence. Under the guise of defending against terrorism, an environment is fostered for greater global US economic, social, political, and cultural monopoly. The consequences of this policy might work against the US's goal of limiting/eliminating 'terrorism' and actually escalate this global security dilemma.

Although the American government's intention to maintain military and economic primacy by actively preventing the rise of any competitors has arguably guided foreign policy over the last century, the objective remained assumed rather than openly stated until NSS02. The proclamation is based on the assumption that US primacy is 'good for global peace and security', though one wonders whose peace, and whose security is being referred to exactly. Security of the international system which allows the American government and those who fall in line underneath it to grow more wealthy while those, especially in the Muslim world, with a different view of society and economics become sources of insecurity that must be eliminated. Stability in the sense that the raw materials and labour of the south can continue to be

exploited for the benefit of the industrialised states of the north without hindrance of indigenous revolutionary forces resisting the process. What dissident academics and security analysts have been pointing out is that despite Bush's insistence that September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, occurred because terrorists 'hate freedom and democracy', the root cause of terrorism in the Middle East appears to be attributed by many to US foreign policy itself.

With the US attempting to enforce its empire through military primacy, American defence spending is likely to continue to rise. The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq have shown US military superiority, yet US occupation of these countries is proving difficult and costly. The four billion (USD) the US spends each month on maintaining occupation of Iraq is becoming a heavier burden with the oil pipelines being sabotaged regularly by resistance fighters. Without vital Iraqi oil revenues, and without the help of the UN, the increasing cost of the 'war on terrorism' is becoming a critical issue for the Bush Administration. Also, such developments suggest that the US perceives the UN's role in international conflict resolution as less of an arbiter of military forces and more associated with the 'clean-up' after 'coalitions of the willing' have achieved their objectives. It remains unclear whether the UN and its members will submit to the will of the US or, more likely, standby until the US is forced to compromise its position on maintaining complete control of Iraq and share decision making, as well as the humanitarian and security concerns, with the UN in order to gain international legitimacy and aid in stabilising Iraq

With the myth of Saddam's WMD dispelled, and the objective of regime change clearly outlawed under the Charter of the United Nations, the US decision to

invade Iraq became a message to the world. The US is not only above the law, but the US will also ensure that all others remain subjects to the law. The 'new multilateralism' is one in which the US will no longer be constrained by obligations to international bodies such as the UN or the ICC. It is, in effect, a primarily unilateral approach to international relations that will accommodate multi-lateral co-operation only when interests are common. The principle guiding the 'new multilateralism' is that the US will try to gain support for its objectives if and where necessary but it will not compromise its objectives in order to gain outside support. This is essentially a unilateralist approach with stress on acting multilaterally where necessary.

Within the Bush Administration, the argument lies between two lines of unilateralist thought on how to implement the 'new multilateralism'; the Wilsonian method of exporting democracy and the Jacksonian inclination towards military force. Yet the implications of who dominates this argument in terms of applied policy are significant. While the US continues to utilize its military hegemony to further its national interests under the guise of self-defense, its ability to develop positive relations with other states will continue to dwindle. The United State's stridently unilateralist stance on the Kyoto Protocol, the ABM treaty, and the new ICC has alienated several key allies, making even the Bush Administrations version of 'multilateral' policy more difficult. If the US does not intend use the established post-1945 institutional framework as a vehicle to 'champion the aspirations of human dignity' and encourage the 'spread of democracy', .these terms may not turn out as attractive in practice as they appear in writing.

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Focus on 'coalitions of the willing' and 'silent partners' rather than more open and inclusive international institutions such as the UN only furthers suspicions that US national security measures will be more often expressed through military force rather than diplomacy. The excessive use of 'hard power' will inhibit the ability to exercise 'soft power', an integral tool for in the neo-Wilsonian objective of 'spreading democracy'. There is every indication that these illegitimate US military occupations have increased animosity, if not toward democracy then toward a 'democracy' installed by the US, and increased the base from which fundamental Islamic militant groups and other resistance and terrorists groups draw recruits. Within this context, the more that 'hard' power is exercised in the 'war on terror' the probability increases of not only further attacks similar to those of September 11, 2001, but an increased likelihood that such attacks might involve more sophisticated approaches. While the US continues to engage in this cycle of violence in such a way as to promote escalation, the 'battle for the Muslim world' will not be realized, as Bush envisions, in 'a struggle of ideas', but rather in a war of as yet unknown proportions.

The assumption that 'spreading democracy' throughout the world, creating global free-trade, will eradicate the underlying causes of terrorism is a vital premise of the 'war on terror'. One cannot help but question whether spreading democracy and free-trade, even in those regions that might not necessarily want it, is being done for national security or national interest, a distinction suspiciously blurred in NSS02.

While the acquisition of nuclear technology remains out of grasp for poorer states, developing WMD remains a viable military option. Contrary to the arguments by academic apologists for US policy, it remains unclear why the US and its allies can

'legitimately' manufacture and utilize advanced WMD and others, specifically those averse to US policy, can not. If there is fear regarding the use of WMD by tyrants or fanatics, looking at the historical record of proliferation of WMD, we find that there is more likelihood of the US inadvertently proliferating WMD than any 'failed' state.

Thus far, 'terrorist' attacks on US targets have been relatively crude bombs made from common materials, and the delivery devices have been common civilian vehicles such as boats, as in the Yemen attack on the US destroyer, or planes as were used in the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, attacks. Even if Iraq, as a 'failed' state, did proliferate WMD, perhaps selling them to Iran or Syria, or giving them to the frustrated Palestinians, who would be responsible? The US developed the most advanced WMD, manufactured them and built complex delivery systems, then put some of these weapons of mass destruction directly into the hands of Saddam Hussein, a tyrannical dictator who was abusing the human rights of his citizens.

This research has examined the four main pillars of the NSS02 and has provided an insight into the intentions of US. The practical application of these pillars in the Middle East points to the pursuance of an American empire and a future war against militant Islam. With US troops being ambushed in Iraq, and the UN sidelined because the US wants to maintain command, some are beginning to wonder if the new US approach is working. Perhaps the four main pillars of NSS02 are not the right tools for the task of spreading democracy throughout the Middle East. Those presenting alternative methods to achieve the same ends argue that the unilateral and militant nature of US policy serves only to exacerbate the underlying causes of terrorist activity. If this is so, then continued US efforts in the region will only

escalate the cycle of violence and increase the chances of a terrorist attack on targets within the western world.

There has been a common supposition throughout the body of literature that the success in implementing the new national security strategy will largely depend on the degree of US military success in Iraq, and the US ability to pacify the local population under a US-sponsored democratic government. If Gaddis's hypothesis that successful implementation of NSS02 depends upon 'being welcomed rather than shot at' in Iraq is any indication, then the future of NSS02 is unstable. Meanwhile the US is standing in defiance of other great powers, the UN, international law, and international public opinion with regards to Iraq. Perhaps the time has come for the US to review alternative courses of action that do not involve (illegal) military force, a process that seemed to absent from the formation of NSS02 in the wake of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. Instead of responding to terrorism with violence, the US has the unique opportunity, given its vast military strength and wealth, to open a dialogue with terrorist organisations in order to understand and perhaps compromise on inherent differences. As President John F. Kennedy stated, "we are not afraid to entrust the American people with unpleasant facts, foreign ideas, alien philosophies, and competitive values. For a nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people" (McGowan 2000:3)

The current operation in Iraq may prove successful for the US, encouraging further implementation of the NSS02, or it might turn into a proverbial marsh of Camarina. In the early sixth century B.C., colonists from Syracuse built the city of

Camarina in southern Sicily. The city was built beside a marsh that was eventually discovered to be the source of the constant occurrence of diseases and so, despite warnings from the local oracle, the colonists devised a plan to drain the marsh. They were successful in doing so, yet in their achievement they created a solid land bridge to their now undefended city. The marsh had provided a natural defense for Camarina, and within 50 years of the city's creation a rival force from Syracuse had crossed the newly created land bridge and killed every man, woman and child, burning the city to the ground. The marsh of Camarina became proverbial for eliminating one threat in such a way as to foster another threat that is more dangerous. In attempting to secure vital oil interests in the Middle East under the US might well be encouraging an emergence of new dynamics in Islamic militarism opposing US policy throughout the Muslim world.

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